"Geopolitical Setting"

Those who can, do; those who can't, complain
Michael Donahue

Geopolitical insecurities abound in Central Asia where Russia№s former monopoly of influence has been rudely displaced by American combat troops and the millions of dollars that follow them around the globe. Russian President Vladimir Putin is not, however, the only one concerned with the spreading of American hegemony into Central Asia. China, domestic Central Asian opposition groups and international human rights organizations also have expressed concern of late over the objectives of the American presence, as well as its undetermined duration.

In a fit of insecurity, Beijing recently accused the United States of pursuing military basing agreements with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in order to facilitate spying on China. [For more information, see the EurasiaNet archives]. While it certainly is likely that the US is gathering intelligence on China from a variety of locations, possibly including Central Asia, it is rather irrational to suggest that the purpose behind recent airbase negotiations is eastern- rather than western-oriented. In contemplating any "second front" in the war on terror, specifically against Iran, the logic behind basing strike and reconnaissance aircraft in Central Asia could be seen only as a necessity. However, self-important paranoia seems to have taken hold in Beijing.

In an increasingly feeble effort to keep the Chinese foot in the Central Asian door, Chinese State Councilor Ismail Amat visited Bishkek in mid-January in order to emphasize the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as the most practical and effective vehicle for regional stability and security, an obvious attempt to draw the region away from Washington. The SCO is certainly a practical vehicle for Russia and China meddling into the affairs of these states that have newfound importance on the international stage, but it is unlikely to be stabilizing: The two dominant forces within the organization have opposing agendas, and even the combined military capabilities of the SCO fall short of those of the United States. Furthermore, and much to the chagrin of Beijing and Moscow, Amat could not make the same bold declaration in the area of economic and social development. For regional development in these critical areas, only the European Union and the United States have the economic depth to bring the region№s potential to fulfillment.

In Mother Russia, Putin himself has come under harsh criticism from hard-line opponents who claim he has, for lack of better terminology, been "soft on capitalism." The tacit acceptance of an American military presence in Central Asia has been called by some in the Russian media as a "significant threat to Russian national security." [For more information, see the EurasiaNet archives]. The reasoning behind this paranoia is the fear that the Russian-dominated Collective Security Treaty (CST) will fall by the wayside as the critical members (Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan) create binding bilateral agreements with the United States.

The true concern for Putin's critics, however, is not diminished security but diminished hegemony, as American and regional prosecution on the war on terror likely will result in fewer Islamic-extremist organizations and thereby enhance Russia's security. It is probable that both the Russian president and his opponents fully understand this basic fact, however, Putin's opposition can muster popular support through appealing to the bruised ego of average Russians who long for a return to the time when the world trembled at their footsteps. What they fail to grasp, however, is that Putin's "soft" policy toward Central Asia is not borne of Wilsonian idealism or even Bismarckian realism, but of a simple cost-benefit analysis of the situation. The cost of attempting to check American regional influence is possibly higher than Moscow can pay, even at the low end of the spectrum. Russia is simply incapable of competing economically or militarily with the United States, even in its own backyard. A more important question is: Why should Moscow even try?

Putin also has a better answer to this question than his critics do. In the long run, Moscow stands to gain from the American involvement in Central Asia for a number of reasons. First, the most likely outcome of the campaign against terror in the region is a decrease in the number Islamic extremist organizations. Secondly, and related to the first, this decrease will help stabilize the region and firm up Russias "soft underbelly." Third, the entire region is experiencing an influx of aid that can result only in substantive improvements in infrastructure and socioeconomic stability. Fourth, the foreign investment climate will be stabilized to facilitate exploitation of Caspian energy reserves, from which Russia will benefit handsomely. And finally, all of this is going to be done largely on the backs of the American and European economies. Metternich he is not, but Putin may be smarter than his opponents like to admit.

http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/pp030302.shtml