Alexander Hramchihin

It no longer makes sense to discuss the international legal aspects of a US occupation of Iraq; it's going to happen no matter what. It is just as pointless to worry about oil prices. The issue at hand is the outcome of the war: both the oil prices and the world's future depend on it.

War might not take place at all if the CIA assassinates Hussein or hires a high-ranking Iraqi official to do it. Then the US troops will triumphantly roll into Baghdad without encountering any resistance. Hussein, however, is not prepared to go gently into that good night and will go to all costs to try to avoid it.

If Hussein does well (i.e., avoids getting killed) and has to go into battle for real, Americans will try to subdue the enemy by fire-bombing them from air much more densely than in 1991, trying to break their will to resist.

All the talk about Iraqi climate heating up to such a degree in a couple of weeks that US troops won’t be able to fight in full equipment has nothing to do with their real problems. Fighter pilots, which traditionally play the lead in all American wars, don't care how hot it is outside of the sealed airplane or helicopter cabin. The infantry, if it must go to battle, will fight at night. All of US military vehicles and all individual soldiers are equipped with night vision devices, while Iraqis have nothing of the kind. During the day, soldiers will lay low, with the rear reserves bringing up an indefinite amount of conditioners and mineral water, while the aviation will guarantee 100% security of the bases from any possible Iraqi attacks. At night, helicopters will drop the troops on the battle field, especially since, in addition to every kind of special forces, the brunt of the strike will be upon the 101st Airborne Division, where helicopters double as tanks and armored vehicles.

In the worst-case scenario, things will go as far as to call for the storm of Baghdad; in this case, both the land-based vehicles and aviation will be rendered meaningless, while helicopters, which will have to patrol the streets, will be vulnerable to even routine firearms. This will be close combat, and the psychological preparedness and the quality of the troops will determine the course of events.

Despite an opinion widespread in the countries of the former USSR, Americans are good soldiers. They have meticulously studied the European military art, and their soldiers and officers are persistent and psychologically stable. The Yanks have always suffered from a certain "European complex," believing European armies to be the absolute military authority. Americans amused the rest of their world with their joy when, on October 25, 1944, six of their battleships cut off the narrow Surigao strait in the South of the Philippines, thus having "crossed the T" for a single miserable old "Yamashiro." I.e., they showed that they could fight like Europeans; while in the meantime, their aircraft carriers demonstrated tactics few European armies could dream of.

US troops have never really suffered any major defeats, despite having fought many serious foes. The only defeat in scores of sea battles is the Battle of Savo Island on Aug 9, 1942, which failed to accomplish anything for the Japanese. The only major defeat on land is a retreat after pressure by the Chinese “volunteer” troops in Korea in the winter of 1950-1951, due to being hugely outnumbered by the enemy. The retreat, nonetheless, was soon curbed.

Arabs are poor fighters, their days of warrior glory date back to the times of the Caliphate. Only the Syrians and the Egyptians have built up some fighting skills in their skirmishes with the Israelis. Iraqis, despite having formally won the war on Iran, had conducted it so poorly that it’s no use discussing their efficiency in battle. After that war, they were given a severe defeat complex by the US.

The recent fear of losses in battle has taken its toll on US troops. There’s an easy explanation: the training of a modern soldier costs a pretty penny, and so human losses are expensive; besides, voters don’t like to see nice American boys die (especially when it’s not particularly clear what they’re dying for). In quantity and quality, US troops far surpass almost any enemy they might have to face; as a result, they truly have an opportunity to limit their losses to zero, and now the absence of losses is a habit. It’s a harmful habit, though — an army afraid of losses is no longer an army. Losses are unavoidable in urban battles. If Baghdad is stormed, things will become clear in the first few days. The victory will belong to whoever doesn’t bend.

If the US Army retreats after losing the first hundred soldiers and calls for B-52s and B-1s, which will reduce the Iraqi capital to rubble, the US will have to face a new explosion of aggressive pacifism throughout the world. Such a “victory” will equate to the worst defeat ever, giving the US an image of a moral freak, a true outcast.

If US soldiers can show that they’re prepared to do whatever it takes, Arabs will bend, and not only the Iraqi Arabs. They’ll see real strength, which is something they can respect. If so, they’ll fall back, for a long time. Naturally, afterwards US will have to face a much better prepared and staunch enemy — North Korea. It looks like North Korea has gone all out to start a war, although its resolve is sure to be tested by the outcome of the campaign in Iraq. Dubya probably doesn’t understand what a pit he got his country in when he decided to treat US soldiers to an all-expenses-paid trip to Baghdad.

http://www.globalrus.org/discussions/strategies/132284