Tajikistan

Opposition in Tajikistan lays low after high-profile arrest

Kambiz Arman

Tajikistan’s ruling party appears solidly in control. In June, voters passed a peaceful referendum on constitutional changes, and on November 12 International Monetary Fund director Horst Kohler gave an upbeat assessment of the government’s financial management. But a trial against the Deputy Chairman of the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) Shamsiddin Shamsiddinov shows the government wants to quiet the religious opposition.

The IRP is the only legal religious party in Central Asia, but Tajikistani authorities seem intent on diminishing its authority. After the civil war ended in 1997, the party won 30 percent share in government that has never really taken effect. Recently, the party’s political influence in the country’s north has grown. Since January, when he reshuffled his cabinet to bolster his reach in the northern provinces, Rahmonov has moved to weaken the party’s influence. In June, IRP chairman Said Abdullo Nuri conciliated Rahmonov by ending objection to a referendum, which passed on June 22, authorizing the president to seek office until as late as 2020. [For background, see the Eurasia Insight archive].

In October, the party again appeared loyal when a spokesman warned that extremist former members had regrouped in Uzbekistan and planned to invade the nation. But the case against Deputy Chairman Shamsiddinov- which the IRP appears intent on quietly withstanding- suggests that Rahmonov intends to strategically limit the party’s legitimacy.

The charges against Shamsiddinov are wide-ranging. He and three of his alleged associates stand accused of treason, organizing a criminal band, illegal border-crossing and polygamy. Chief Military Prosecutor Sharif Kurbanov accused them of over 70 crimes, including murder. Initially, in early June, when authorities detained Shamsiddinov, the officials accused him in connection with a murder that occurred in 1995. Kurbanov insisted that Shamsiddinov’s political affiliation has nothing to do with the investigation. Nuri has maintained that Shamsiddinov was misidentified by government witnesses. According to some reports, the accused never got to speak with a lawyer.

This litany of charges seems more akin to the prosecution of dissident journalists in Kazakhstan than to recent Tajikistani history. [For background see the EurasiaNet Insight archive]. Now, however, such tactics are party of the government’s strategy. Despite the existence of amnesty laws from 1997 and 1999 that allowed most defeated opposition figures to return peacefully after the war, Shamsiddinov seems on trial, unofficially, for his association with the losing side.

Shamsiddinov’s arrest is not the only episode to awaken fresh concerns of a crackdown against the government’s Islamic rivals. Several members of IRP had been arrested and jailed during 2003. In late August, "unregistered mosques" in Dushanbe, the capital, learned that they have no permission to broadcast the call to prayer through loudspeakers. Shamsiddin Nuriddinov, a religious-affairs official in city government, told reporters that his superiors had communicated a "request" along these lines to select imams. But he insisted that mosques which had not registered were "illegal places" rather than houses of worship- even though many people say there is no national law requiring religious registration.

Throughout these events, IRP Chairman Nuri has maintained a mild attitude toward the government. He has discussed releasing alternative economic plans for the country and assigned himself the task of sounding warnings about extremist organizing across the border. In an October interview, he endorsed the government’s ban on radical Islamist organization Hizb-ut-Tahrir. After the January purge, many observers expected Nuri to eventually take the government to task. All along, he has maintained that he cares more about peace than anything else, and refused to foment instability.

Some observers say that Nuri keenly understands how his power has waned. His greatest field commanders carry government portfolios and are keener to keep their positions than to become deeply involved in party struggle. If Nuri struck out against the government, the thinking goes, he could lose his statesman status and have nowhere to go but into obscurity. Some say he might even have to go underground. At the same time, with IRP’s representation in government shrinking, it is hard to see how Nuri can muster any influence.

For now, Nuri seems content to win symbolic victories. His party sometimes meets with foreign envoys, say sources, and won the right to host a conference in Rahmonov’s home town in October. If Shamsiddinov’s plight draws international sympathy and outrage, Nuri’s party might gain some bargaining advantage. But Rahmonov seems to be consolidating power more quickly than any IRP advantage can grow.

Editor’s Note: Kambiz Arman is the pseudonym for an independent journalist covering Tajikistan. Some of the reporting this article refers to comes from the Asia-Plus news agency, which has had a content-sharing relationship with EurasiaNet in the past.

http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/rights/articles/eav111203.shtml